As the number of marital disputes rises after a house demolition, women are forced to look for work in order to support the livelihood of their families. Estimates for the total casualties of World War II vary, but most suggest that some 60 million people died in the war, including about 20 million soldiers and 40 million civilians. When war strikes it ends up affecting government structures along with the people in power of the government. Some scholars, however, have argued that war can have a positive effect on political development.
Political scientist Jeffrey Herbst argues that interstate war is a requisite factor in the formation of strong states. Charles Tilly, an American sociologist, political scientist, and historian, claims that within the context of European history, "war makes states. War making resulted in state making in four ways: .
War making and the extraction, protection, and state making that followed were interdependent. Tilly ultimately argues that the interactions between these four processes influenced the classic European state making experience. The effects of conflict and its aftermath in Palestine reveals distinct types of disadvantages that worsen gender relations in both men and women.
The longstanding effects of Israeli occupation and policies of siege, confinement and confiscation of land have resulted in social as well as an economic crisis for Palestinians. In the light of an increasingly failing security and living conditions, most efforts should be directed at everyday survival and creating a more stable environment for the Palestinian peoples.
The pushing of gender issues should be at the peak of the political agenda. One stark illustration of the effect of war upon economies is the Second World War. The Great Depression of the s ended as nations increased their production of war materials to serve the war effort. Property damage in the Soviet Union inflicted after the Axis invasion was estimated to a value of billion rubles. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
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The advent of chemical warfare added to the soldier's perils. Sea and airborne weapons made killing from a distance more effective as well. Guns mounted on ships were able to strike targets up to twenty miles inland. The stealth and speed of German submarines gave Germany a considerable advantage in its dominance of the North Sea. Although airplanes were technologically crude, they offered a psychological advantage.
Fighter pilot aces such as Manfred von Richthofen, Germany's "Red Baron," became celebrities and heroes, capturing the world's imagination with their daring and thrilling mid-air maneuvers. Newspapers charted the public's reaction—horror and vengeance—to these technological advancements. Although contemporary wars are predominantly of the new type, they may also include old war characteristics.
Likewise, during the modern period, there were more or less continuous instances of warfare as part of the process of colonization of other parts of the globe by European powers, and though they were not often called war, they might be better explained in terms of the logic of new wars.
Some features of contemporary wars are, of course, empirically new, most notably the transformation of communications technologies and the way this has contributed to new forms of networked organizations, new forms of mobilization through social media and websites, and new terror tactics based on publicizing atrocities. Old wars were an essential element of state-building. Modern wars centralized power, mobilized the population, and encouraged economic self-sufficiency. To raise money for wars, governments increased and improved the efficiency of taxation, increased borrowing, regularized banking, and established central banks.
In Western countries, this involved an implicit bargain, in which the population gained increased rights in return for paying taxes and fighting in wars—initially civil and political rights but, in the twentieth century, economic and social rights as well. In Eastern Europe and Asia, by and large, funds for fighting wars were extracted through increased repression rather than through a bargaining process, so the repressive capacity of the state was also developed.
War established an international and domestic hierarchy that provided the basis for order in the intervening period before the next war. And wars produced technological and organizational innovations that contributed to the transformation of both the state apparatus and the broader socioeconomic context. Contemporary wars are almost exactly the opposite. They disassemble the state. Participation is low. They are decentralized and globalized wars. They involve the disintegration of federations, such as the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. Taxation is low and finance comes from war-related activities.
State services such as health, education, police, or courts are decimated.
They produce fragmented and often transnational extremist political identities. They lead to waves of forced migration. They also give birth to new transnational assemblages of security and humanitarianism formed to tackle their problems; that is to say, external interventions by the United Nations and other multilateral institutions and by a whole array of international NGOs and private contractors. The wars that evolved during the modern period were discontinuous. While the military capabilities acquired by states and indeed private companies were used almost continuously for colonial purposes, major clashes between European states took place only intermittently.
The intervals in between major wars gave rise to a corresponding concept of peace. Philosophers and political thinkers began to develop schemes for perpetual peace during the Enlightenment era.
This period saw the rise of secular intellectuals associated with an enlarged merchant or capitalist class—consisting of growing numbers of teachers, doctors, writers, or lawyers—that developed alongside the traditionally dominant warrior nobility and clergy. Most of these schemes were based on the assumption that war was between states, and they proposed to end war through proposals for some form of league or federation of nations based on a permanent peace treaty.
Peace movements developed throughout the nineteenth century with regular pan-European congresses that put forward peace schemes designed to end conflict between nations, aimed at establishing instruments of international arbitration such as the court established at the Peace Palace in The Hague.
It was this version of peace that was championed by Andrew Carnegie. The Soviet Union espoused this understanding of peace as peace from above, negotiated among states and associated with noninterference in internal affairs—in other words, as the absence of old war.
This was reflected in peace research databases of war established during the Cold War period, such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program that defined war as interstate or intrastate and involving a certain number of battle deaths. For these old-fashioned advocates of peace, the main method of peacemaking was top-down diplomacy among states. Wars could be ended either by victory for one side or by talks that resulted in a compromise between the parties.
Yet in new war contexts, this understanding of peace has turned out to be counterproductive. The various armed groups are not states in waiting; rather, they represent a combination of gangsterism and political extremism. The agreements are usually the moment when some kind of international presence is deployed. Both because of the international presence and because the narrative of war is harder to justify, this may also reduce violence against civilians. These agreements, basically, freeze the social condition of a new war, and so, in most cases, violence continues after the agreement albeit often at a lower level of intensity.